Types and approaches to definition

Definition is full of complexities. Due to the great difference in purpose of and method used between a) type of definition, and b) definitional approach, it is essential that, prior to all formal discussions about definition, discussants be informed of these difficulties and state their approach. If this is not done and discussants jump straight into the process of definition with no knowledge of these dilemmas, it is likely that these dilemmas will cause great confusion and even conflict about the proposed definitions. Clarifying one’s starting position will allow discussants to determine whether their differences lay in more fundamental issues than a simple difference of opinion regarding proposed definitions.

Below are some steps discussants can employ to make this process more constructive.

Clarify your purpose

One of the critiques of the process of defining design is that it serves no purpose. This alone can be a source of disagreement among discussants. But, as the first panel demonstrates, there are clear and specific situations for when a definition of design is important. Prior to engaging in a discussion about the definition of design, a first step is to agree on its value in relation to a specific purpose. Without this understanding, discussants may see the whole endeavour as moot. Importantly, one doesn’t have to choose a definition that satisfies all types of design. Instead, one can choose a definition that satisfies one’s practical end. A criteria for evaluating proposed definitions can be developed based on how well it satisfies this practical end.

Types of definition

The following is a survey of the four main types. There are others, but they are either not relevant for the definition of design or are sub-types within each listed below and, therefore, are discussed later:

1. An “ostensive definition” is one used to describe a thing that can be pointed to, and particularly useful for things that are difficult to explain using words, such as colour but not good for explaining abstract or complex phenomena (Govier, 2005, p. 96).

2. A “lexical definition” tries to list and describe all common usages of a term (p. 96); These are the definitions you would find in a dictionary. This method often uses the etymology (study of the history of words and how their form and meaning have changed over time) to inform the definition of the word being defined.

3. A “stipulative definition” states what a term ought to mean, and may be adopted as a lexical definition if widely used (p. 99). The notion of “ought” is crucial here because it implies stipulative definition is a persuasive act. That is, one must provide reasons to its listeners as to why they should change their usage of the term.

4. An “operational definition” is a type of stipulative definition, commonly used in scientific study for defining an “abstract word in terms of concrete experience” (p. 101). For the purposes of this paper, there is little need to distinguish between an operational and stipulative definitions.

In relation to defining design, each type of definition has varying levels of use value. Ostensive definition is the least useful type because, as discussed above, it does not explain abstract terms very well; one cannot develop a foundation for a discipline by just pointing to a set of objects. Theory requires an articulation of definition that can be scrutinized through written or spoken language. That said, through the process of articulating a definition of design, it is highly useful to point to examples that are the product of design. This is especially important when explaining a definition to a design audience that largely learns through visualization.

Lexical definition is valuable but, again, limited. In defining the discipline of design, if one simply referred to a dictionary, one would immediately be faced with this limitation: which of the twelve or so definitions provided in the dictionary does one use to define the discipline? Even if the dictionary provides a definition explicitly for the discipline, we then need to ask whether the definition is appropriate. In order to choose one of the lexical definitions and to determine the appropriateness of the definition chosen, one needs a justification or reasons. In other words, there is an element of persuasion involved through articulation. Persuasion not based on past usage of the word design, but rather on conceptual and pragmatic grounds. Arguing for a definition in this way means we are now using a stipulative definition.

Approaches: Essentialist vs Anti-essentialist

Within stipulative definition, there are two important epistemological debates about approach that have an impact on the method to be used: the essentialism vs. anti-essentialism debate and the real vs. nominal definition debate. In exploring these debates I will also introduce Edward Schiappa’s approach which is the basis for the proposed approach to defining design.

An essentialist approach assumes one can define the essential features of a thing such that these features are universally true with no exceptions. The essential features are also known as the necessary and sufficient conditions. For example, the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a bachelor are being “male” and “unmarried.” Being male and unmarried are sufficient because we don’t need additional conditions for a person to be considered a bachelor and they are necessary because every bachelor is unmarried and male. Opposed to this essentialist view, are the anti-essentialists of which there are several flavors. The most famous is philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s theory of family resemblances, which assumes that words such as “game” and “art” do not have such universally true features but rather a patchwork of related resemblances that may or may not fit to each application (Weitz, 2007, p. 190). In the case of defining design, the essentialism debate is very important, since design falls into the same category of ambiguous terms as game and art. One could argue that the elusive nature of the term and inability of the community to come to a shared definition is proof that a finite set of necessary and sufficient conditions does not exist. On the other hand, if we take a pragmatic approach to defining design, one could argue for the essentialist approach based on its utility. That is, creating a set of conditions for what constitutes design is useful because it allows the community to develop principles for the discipline, differentiate design from other disciplines, etc.

Even if one is not interested in operationalizing a definition, and is interested for simply the sake of gaining a better understanding of the concept, philosopher Noël Carroll (1999) argues that the essentialist approach has “immense heuristic value: “By ‘heuristic value,’ we mean that the method alerts us systematically to the richness and complexity of the phenomenon that confronts us” (p. 10).

Approaches: Real vs nominal

The second key debate within stipulative definition is between those that consider definition to be “real” or “nominal.” For Plato, a “real” definition was a search for the Ideal Form, that is, a definition that describes the “true” and “universal” nature of a term (Schiappa, 2003, p. 36). This view depends on “metaphysical absolutism: the belief that things have independent, “objective” structures of essences that are knowable “in themselves” (Schiappa, p. 36; quoting Barnes, p. 79-83, 1982). While this approach may seem appropriate when trying to define physical phenomena like “tree” or “planet” which necessarily involves identification of properties that are objectively perceived, the approach quickly becomes complicated when defining social or metaphysical concepts like “justice” and “good.” What are the essential characteristics of “justice” that we can objectively conceive? Even with the definition of “tree,” a real definition is problematic because it is unclear how one can determine which characteristics are objectively essential. According to Schiappa, the essence of a thing depends on one’s interest/context, therefore, one cannot search for the “absolute” essence of a thing. For example, a lumberjack may define a tree with an emphasis on characteristics that allow him to distinguish trees from things he cannot chop down, while a chemical engineer may define trees according to its molecular makeup. In other words, “[a] thing-as-experienced may have as many essences as we have interests” (Schiappa, 2003, p. 41). Based on this major critique, philosopher Richard Robinson, along with most modern philosophers, objects to the notion of “real” definitions because they are “at best a mistake and at worst a lie” (Schiappa, 2003, p. 48; Robinson, 1950, p. 170). Robinson uses the word lie because a real definition gives the “false impression” that definition is a matter of correcting “knowledge of facts” rather than a process of isolating characteristics that are relevant to a given purpose (Schiappa, 2003, p. 48; Robinson, 1950, p. 170). To resolve this confusion, Robinson and Schiappa argue that all definitions should be viewed as nominal—that is, an account of how a word should be used. For Schiappa, the clearest way of resolving this confusion is to rephrase the definitional question:

Instead of posing the questions in the time-honored manner of “What is X?” …, I suggest that we reformulate the matter as “How ought we use the word X?” given our particular reasons for defining X. Specifically, I advocate that we think of one appropriate form of definition as “X counts as Y in context C.” (Schiappa, 2003, p. xi)

Reformulating the question in this way does three very important things. First, the use of “ought” rather than “is” makes it clear that definition is a matter of persuading others to adopt a new usage of a word rather than a search for the essence of a thing. Second, clarifying that we are defining a word within a specific “context” makes clear to those engaged in the discussion that context matters, both in terms of how the definition is formulated, but also in how it is evaluated. Thirdly, notion of “we” emphasizes the very social nature of the process of definition.

Proposed type and approach: Stipulative & pragmatic

I propose that designers approach definition from a pragmatic perspective, seeing definition as a proposal for new usage that must be negotiated by designers according to the purposes of definition that they collectively determine. This community of designers could be small (a school faculty determining a definition or vision of design for curriculum development) or large (determining a common usage for a community of researchers). This approach assumes that definition is nominal and, therefore, avoids metaphysical dilemmas about the “true”  or “real” nature of design, and instead evaluates proposed definitions based upon practical ends.